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IN WHOSE HANDS ARE WE PLACING
CHILDREN'S HEALTH?: AN EXAMINATION OF




In a perfect world, every child would have an equal chance at success.
Every child would have equal resources, opportunities, and fair treatment.
Although the world is not perfect, the imperfections should not materialize
in a court system that perpetuates injustice and inequality. Unfortunately,
through the state-by-state administration of Medicaid programs, the courts
embody these imperfections. This process of state-by-state administration
allows for differing opinions and inconsistent decisions by judges, and, in
turn, leads to unequal medical services provided to children.
Imagine a child who is severely disabled, has been diagnosed with mental
retardation, and is both blind and nonverbal - a child so physically limited
that she cannot feed herself, she requires continuous care to monitor her
medications, and she must be repositioned throughout the day. Now
imagine that child's parents being told that the child's physician does not
have the authority to decide what treatment and services the child needs, but
instead, the parents must present evidence to the court as to why their child
requires a certain number of hours of nursing care at home.
This is the reality for some children in jurisdictions where courts fail to
uphold Congress's intent in the administration of Medicaid's Early, Periodic
Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment (EPSDT) program.I In other
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1. Early, Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment Services (EPSDT), 42 U.S.C. §
1396d(r) (2006).
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jurisdictions, children are properly2 served and cared for through this
program the way Congress intended.
Now, imagine a child who is lucky enough to have insurance reimburse
his family for his physical therapy services. Even with regular physical
therapy, he will never walk, but therapy will keep his muscles from severely
tightening and will prevent loss of all functionality. Or imagine a child
whose insurance pays for incontinence briefs - not because they will cure
her incontinence, but because it makes her condition a little more bearable
by preventing skin conditions and infection.
In the first scenario, a child is denied nursing services necessary for the
management of her severe disabilities which require continuous care and
frequent administration of medication.3 In the second and third scenarios,
the children are provided services that will not correct their problems, but
will make their problems more manageable.4 All three examples are real life
stories of children enrolled in Medicaid, but all three are facing vastly
different realities due to court decisions.5
Medicaid has a specific provision for care of individuals under the age of
twenty-one known as Early, Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment
(EPSDT).6 EPSDT has two threshold requirements that limit the services a
state must provide to children.7 First, the medical treatment must be
medically necessary.8  Second, the service must be used to "correct or
ameliorate" a condition discovered through prior screening or diagnosis.9
All courts use these requirements to determine what services are medically
2. Salazar v. District of Columbia, 954 F. Supp. 278, 303 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(explaining that "[t]he purpose of the EPSDT program is to ensure that poor children
receive comprehensive health care at an early age, so that they will develop fewer health
problems as they get older.").
3. Moore v. Reese, 637 F.3d 1220, 1220 (1Ith Cir. 2011).
4. See generally A.M.T. v. Gargano, 781 F. Supp. 2d 798 (S.D. Ind. 2011); see also
Ekloff v. Rodgers, 443 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1180-81 (D. Ariz. 2006).
5. See generally Moore, 637 F.3d at 1220.; see also A.MT., 781 F. Supp. 2d 798;
Ekloff v. Rodgers, 443 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1180-81 (D. Ariz. 2006).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d.
7. Id. § 1396d(r).
8. Id. § 1396d(r)(5).
9. Id.
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necessary under the Medicaid statute. If services do not meet this standard,
Medicaid is not required to provide coverage.
The Early, Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment program was
intended by Congress to be an expansive and comprehensive program.io
However, children are still being denied access to medically necessary
services. Specifically, there are two important and inconsistent trends. First,
administrators of certain state Medicaid programs are successfully
challenging the medical services provided to children, and those courts are
implementing higher standards to prove necessity of treatments. Second,
some courts are liberally interpreting the statutory condition of "to correct or
ameliorate" and are approving maintenance therapies and preventive care for
children with chronic conditions.
In regards to the first trend, by granting states more power to determine
the medical necessity of a particular service, courts are moving away from
Congress's intent to have a comprehensive program and are consistently
providing less coverage than the statute requires. In this way, the statutory
language alone is not enough to convey Congressional intent. For that
reason, it is important that the statutory language be clarified and courts
subsequently be required to apply a more expansive view, covering the
services that children need, and retracting state power to challenge the
necessity of these services.
The second trend is radically different from the first as it conforms to
Congressional intent and furthers the goals of the EPSDT program. Here,
courts are correctly interpreting the statutory requirement "to correct or
ameliorate," but are inconsistent in their interpretation of "medically
necessary." Without statutory clarification that emphasizes the ultimate
goals of the EPSDT program, children will continue to be at risk of being
denied necessary services.
This note seeks to explore the recent case law involving EPSDT in various
jurisdictions and to propose an appropriate solution to courts' application of
medical necessity for children afflicted by medical conditions. Part II
provides a short history of the Medicaid program and explains how and why
EPSDT was incorporated into the statute. Part III explores the standard of
medical necessity used in the Medicaid program and compares various
approaches, recent changes, and their implications. Part IV applies the
medical necessity standard to EPSDT cases specifically and discusses the
10. S. REP. No. 89-404, at 1943-44 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943,
1986; see also Salazar v. District of Columbia, 954 F. Supp. 278, 303 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(explaining that "[t]he purpose of the EPSDT program is to ensure that poor children
receive comprehensive health care at an early age, so that they will develop fewer health
problems as they get older").
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move toward increased state power in determining medical necessity and
less coverage for children. Part V incorporates the issue of maintenance
therapy in applying the medical necessity standard and illustrates a trend
toward more expansive coverage for children and, ultimately, less discretion
for states. Lastly, Part VI analyzes how the application of this standard
undermines Congressional intent in creating the EPSDT program. Part VI
provides a recommendation on how to bridge these two differing approaches
to medical necessity and how to balance state and physician discretion
through a clarification of the Medicaid statutes and a uniform guideline for
all jurisdictions on which services are eligible under EPSDT.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY
A. Medicaid
Medicaid was enacted by Congress in 1965 as part of the Social Security
Act." In general, Medicaid is a federal assistance program providing
medical services to "the needy and medically needy aged, blind, disabled,
and families with dependent children."l 2 The goal of the program is
to furnish (1) medical assistance on behalf of families with
dependent children and of aged, blind, or disabled individuals,
whose incomes and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of
necessary medical services, and (2) rehabilitation and other
services to help such families and individuals attain or retain
capability for independence or self-care.... 13
Currently, Medicaid provides coverage to approximately 53 million
people.14 All states and the District of Columbia have opted into the
11. S. Rep. No. 89-404.
12. Id. For a complete discussion of eligibility guidelines and program criteria, see
John Bigler, Diane Archer, & John Regan, An Overview of Social Security, Medicare,
and Medicaid, 65 N.Y. ST. B.J. 14 (1993).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1; see also Meyers v. Reagan, 776 F.2d 241, 243 (8th Cir.
1985) (citing the purpose of Medicaid as laid out in 42 U.S.C. § 1396 and stating that
"[t]o achieve this goal, Congress requires participating states to provide financial
assistance in a number of general categories of medical treatment" pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1396a(a)(10)(A), 1396d(a)(1)-(5), (17)).
14. The Kaiser Comm'n on Medicaid and the Uninsured, Ten Myths About
Medicaid, KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION 1 (2012), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/
upload/7306%2OTen%20Myths%20about%20Medicaid Final-3.pdf.
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program. While participation in Medicaid is optional for all states, the
federal government establishes guidelines that all participating states must
follow to receive Medicaid funds.16 Specifically, states must provide
services of a sufficient "amount, duration, and scope"' 7 to reasonably
achieve the purpose of the service being provided.18 In addition, federal law
describes the form of "medical assistance" provided as "payment of part or
all of the cost of the following care and services or the care and services
themselves." 9 Medicaid's care and services include a vast array of medical
services as listed in 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(1) through § 1396d(a)(29).
B. Early, Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment
EPSDT is a provision of Medicaid added in 196720 that provides services
21for individuals under the age of twenty-one. Under the statute as enacted
in 1967, EPSDT was an optional provision and some states chose not to
provide these services to children in their state Medicaid plans.22 Congress
amended Medicaid in 1989 with the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act to
provide more comprehensive and consistent services to children in states
that did not participate in EPSDT. This Act established EPSDT services as
mandatory under state Medicaid programs, and that individuals under age
15. Id.
16. R.K. v. Dillenberg, 836 F. Supp. 694, 696 (D. Ariz. 1993) (clarifying that "state
governments possess primary responsibility for administration of the program, but in so
doing must abide by the requirements of the Act to qualify for receipt of federal Medicaid
funds").
17. 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(b) (2006).
18. Id; see also Weaver v. Reagen, 886 F.2d 194, 197 (8th Cir. 1989) (referring to
42 CFR § 440.230(b) and forbidding states from arbitrarily reducing the amount or scope
of services).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a) (2006); see also S. REP. No. 89-404.
20. Rachel Min Luke, Reading Between the Lines: Medicaid, Early Periodic
Screening Diagnosis and Treatment, and Section 1983, 7 SEATTLE J. FOR Soc. JusT. 737,
739 (2009).
21. 42 U.S.C. §1396d(a)(43)(A).
22. S.D. ex rel. Dickinson v. Hood, 391 F.3d 581, 589 (5th Cir. 2004).
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23twenty-one are entitled to such services. Consequently, any state
participating in the federal Medicaid program must include EPSDT services
to children in their state program.
The EPSDT provision of Medicaid calls for states to seek out children
eligible for covered services, provide appropriate screenings, and implement
the necessary treatment for conditions diagnosed via the screenings. 24 The
statute sets out required intervals at which screening services are to be
provided25 and lists the types of screening services required, including
physical and mental exams, immunizations, and laboratory tests. EPSDT
also requires state programs to provide vision tests,27 dental screenings,28
hearing screenings, and treatment for all three.
The more commonly litigated and debated provision of EPSDT is section
1396d(r)(5), which states that EPSDT programs in each state must include
"[s]uch other necessary health care, diagnostic services, treatment, and other
measures described in subsection (a) of this section to correct or ameliorate
defects and physical and mental illnesses and conditions discovered by the
screening services, whether or not such services are covered under the State
plan."3 Understanding this section of the Medicaid statute is crucial to fully
grasping the vast range of services encompassed within the EPSDT
provision. Section 1396d(r)(5) is a catch-all, as it covers necessary services,
treatments, and measures that improve or treat conditions for children,
regardless of whether the state plan provides those services to adults enrolled
in Medicaid. Thus, children are entitled to more services than adults and are
provided with all necessary services.
23. Id. at 589-90.
24. 42 U.S.C. §1396d(a)(43); see also Chisholm v. Hood, 110 F. Supp. 2d 499, 508
(E.D. La. 2000) (requiring the state to ensure children who need and are entitled to
services under EPSDT actually receive them).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r)(1)(A).
26. Id. § 1396d(r)(1)(B).
27. Id. § 1396d(r)(2).
28. Id. § 1396d(r)(3).
29. Id. § 1396d(r)(4).
30. Id. § 1396d(r)(2)-(4).
31. Id. § 1396d(r)(5).
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In S.D. ex rel. Dickson v. Hood, the state Medicaid agency did not dispute
that a sixteen-year-old who lacked sensation below his waist was eligible for
EPSDT, or that the treatment sought - incontinence underwear - was
medically necessary, as it served to "correct or ameliorate" the child's
32condition. Instead, the state argued that, inter alia, Louisiana's Medicaid
plan explicitly excluded such incontinence products from EPSDT
coverage. Louisiana took the position that it had the authority to limit the
services provided by Medicaid. 4  The Fifth Circuit disagreed, explaining
that:
The natural reading of § 1396d(r)(5)'s phrases is that all of the
health care, services, treatments and other measures described by §
1396d(a) must be provided by state Medicaid agencies when
necessary to correct or ameliorate unhealthful conditions
discovered by screening, regardless of whether they are covered
by the state plan. 3
The court determined that states cannot limit the services Medicaid must
provide to children, even when those children would not otherwise be
covered by the state's Medicaid plan. In other words, children who are
eligible for Medicaid are entitled to receive any other medically necessary
service, even if adults in the same state's Medicaid plan are not entitled to
such services. Thus, while the EPSDT provision greatly expands the array
of services available to children on Medicaid, the amended EPSDT
provision limits those services through the medical necessity provision.
In spite of the medical necessity limitation placed on the services under
EPSDT, the program was intended to be preventive in nature. In the first of
a string of lawsuits brought on behalf of children for a state's failure to
provide EPSDT services, the court clarified that the nature and purpose of
the EPSDT program is "to ensure that poor children receive comprehensive
32. Dickinson, 391 F.3d at 585.
33. Id. at 587.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 589.
36. Id. at 590 ("Every Circuit which has examined the scope of the EPSDT program
has recognized that states must cover every type of health care or service necessary for
EPSDT corrective or ameliorative purposes that is allowable under § 1396d(a)" (citing
Collins v. Hamilton, 349 F.3d 371, 376 n. 8 (7th Cir. 2003)); see Collins, 349 F.3d at 376
n. 8 (noting that "a state's discretion to exclude services deemed 'medically necessary' . .
. has been circumscribed by the express mandate of the statute.").
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health care at an early age, so that they will develop fewer health problems
as they get older." EPSDT provides screenings to detect potential
problems for children early on, then later provides a diagnosis of any
problems detected, and treats any developing conditions. As the court notes,
"[p]reventive health care identifies health problems that may respond to
early treatment but, if left undiagnosed and untreated, may instead lead to
serious disorders or conditions."3 8  Therefore, the primary purpose of
Medicaid's EPSDT program is to avoid the onset of health problems and to
eliminate the discomfort and affliction affecting so many young people.
III. DEFINING "MEDICALLY NECESSARY" FOR MEDICAID
PURPOSES
Medicaid established the medical necessity standard to be applied to all
populations to whom it provides services. EPSDT then incorporates
additional standards to determine which services it will provide for children.
Thus, it is critical to first set forth the standards by which the general
Medicaid program determines which services are medically necessary for
patients before discussing EPSDT standards and analyzing medical necessity
in that realm. The Medicaid statute lays out twenty-eight categories of
medical services for which state programs will provide monetary assistance
to patients. A state must provide the "amount, duration, and scope"40 of
37. Salazar v. District of Columbia, 954 F. Supp. 278, 303 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
38. Id.
39. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396d(a)(l)-(29) (Supp. IV 2011). These categories are: inpatient
hospital services; outpatient hospital services; laboratory and X-ray services; nursing
facility services; physicians' services furnished by a physician; medical care; home health
care services; private duty nursing services; clinic services furnished by or under the
direction of a physician; dental services; physical therapy and related services; prescribed
drugs, dentures, prosthetic devices, and eyeglasses; other diagnostic, screening,
preventive, and rehabilitative services; inpatient hospital services and nursing facility
services for individuals 65 years of age or over in an institution for mental diseases;
services in an intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded; inpatient psychiatric
hospital services for individuals under age 21; services furnished by a nurse-midwife;
hospice care; case-management services; respiratory care services; services furnished by
a certified pediatric nurse practitioner or certified family nurse practitioner; home and
community care for functionally disabled elderly individuals; community supported
living arrangements services; personal care services furnished to an individual who is not
an inpatient or resident of a hospital, nursing facility, intermediate care facility for the
mentally retarded, or institution for mental disease; primary care case management
services; services furnished under a PACE program; primary and secondary medical
strategies and treatment and services for individuals who have Sickle Cell Disease;
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the service that is sufficient "to reasonably achieve the purpose" 41 of that
service. However, given the breadth of services eligible for coverage by
Medicaid, the federal government does not prohibit states from limiting the
duration or scope of services. It does, however, prevent states from denying
coverage or reducing the amount or scope of services based on the diagnosis
or condition of the patient.42 Specifically, it suggests that "medical
necessity" is an appropriate limit on services provided.43  In the 1977
Supreme Court case, Beal v. Doe, the Supreme Court determined that the
medical necessity standard is proper and that states are free to limit services
provided by Medicaid through this standard.4
Beal v. Doe addressed whether states were required to provide Medicaid
funds for abortions. 45  The question turned on whether abortions were
medically necessary. Ultimately, the Court decided that only where there
was documentation or medical evidence that the abortion was necessary46
were states required to fund such procedures using Medicaid assistance.47
This case also determined that the state may give deference to a physician's
opinion, so long as there is evidence that the procedure is medically
necessary, as opposed to merely a desirable procedure to the patient.48 Since
Beal v. Doe, courts have taken various approaches in answering the question
of who may determine whether a procedure is "medically necessary."
freestanding birth center services; and " any other medical care, and any other type of
remedial care recognized under State law, specified by the Secretary." Id.
40. 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(a) (2006).
41. Id. § 440.230(b).
42. Id. § 440.230(c).
43. Id. § 440.230(d).
44. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 444 (1977).
45. Id. at 443-44.
46. Examples might include situations where the mother's health is at risk, where the
child may have a physical or mental deficiency, or where the pregnancy was a product of
incest, rape, or other legally established violation.
47. Beal, 432 U.S. at 445-48.
48. Id.
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Additionally, courts have attempted to find ways to give states more control
over determining the amount of medically necessary services.
A. The Two-Level Approach: Giving Physicians Discretion
One such approach conceptualizes the determination of medical necessity
as a two-level process, ultimately giving physicians the freedom to make the
determinations of what care is medically necessary for a patient. In Cowan
v. Myers, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in California explains
that, "[f]irst, the state must decide which services are necessary; then, out of
the covered services, the physician may determine which treatment is
necessary for a particular condition." 4 9 Therefore, clarifying a previous
decision, the Cowan court states, "once a state plan has agreed to cover
certain types of services, it may not exclude covered services for one
particular condition where the physician determines the treatment is
necessary."50
An example of this type of decision-making approach is found in the 1980
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit's decision, Pinneke v.
Preisser.51 In this case, the plaintiff sought Medicaid assistance for the cost
of his sex reassignment surgery, a procedure prohibited from Medicaid
52assistance under his state's Medicaid program. When funding was denied,
the court found that the surgery was a treatment that could not be prohibited,
as it fell under the umbrella of "inpatient hospital services" and "physicians'
services," 53 which are two of the five categories that states are required to
provide assistance for through Medicaid programs.54
The analysis used by this approach begins with an umbrella of services -
the state determines what range of services will be provided under the state
plan. Then, once under that umbrella, anything determined by physicians to
be medically necessary must be covered. Therefore, the determination
49. Cowan v. Myers, 187 Cal. App. 3d 968, 978 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (referring to
the two-part test established in Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis, 591 F.2d 121, 125-27 (1st Cir.
1979)); see also Pinneke v. Preisser, 623 F.2d 546, 550 (8th Cir. 1980).
50. Cowan, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 978.
51. Pinneke, 623 F.2d at 546.
52. Id. at 547.
53. Id. at 550.
54. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396d(a)(1)-(5) (2006).
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begins with the state and is then handed off to physicians to make a final
decision about medical necessity. Allowing the physicians to use their
discretion in making such determinations requires the state to put its trust in
these physicians not to abuse the privilege by committing fraud or causing
Medicaid to provide funds for services that are not medically necessary for
patients. At the same time, however, the provision allows physicians - the
individuals in arguably the best position to make medical decisions
regarding diagnosis and treatment of a patient - to make such decisions
freely. Here, the physician has an advantage as he or she can find a way to
categorize a treatment that fits under the umbrella.
B. The Stricter Approach: State Review ofPhysicians'Decisions
Rush v. Parham, a Fifth Circuit case also from 1980, involved a similar
set of facts as Pinneke, but the court arrived at a different conclusion. 5 The
court decided that transsexual surgery was experimental and therefore not
medically necessary, opposing the physician's determination that the
procedure was proper. The court in Rush applied a different approach by
holding "a state Medicaid agency can review the medical necessity of
treatment prescribed by a doctor on a case-by-case basis." 5 6 This case-by-
case limitation is in clear opposition to the two-level approach, which places
a preliminary limitation upon entire types of treatment. The state review
approach works in reverse, granting physicians discretion but subjecting
their decisions to approval and review by the state.
This strict approach allows a state to review a physician's determination,
in contrast to the two-level approach, which requires physicians to adhere to
the state's pre-approved treatments and services. Specifically, the stricter
approach grants states the power to limit a physician's discretion in
determining such services. This analysis starts by allowing the physician to
make a recommendation of services or treatment for a particular patient.
According to Rush, a physician has "the primary responsibility of
determining what treatment should be made available to his patients."57 The
physician's recommendation is then subject to state approval, as the state has
the authority to determine whether the physician's treatment is actually
medically necessary, or if the services recommended are not within the
scope of Medicaid coverage.58 While this strict approach resembles the two-
55. Rush v. Parham, 625 F.2d 1150, 1150 (5th Cir. 1980).
56. Id. at 1155.
57. Id. at 1156.
58. Id. at 1154-56.
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level approach in that there are state limits on the treatments, the approaches
differ in that the strict approach permits the physicians to first make a
recommendation before it is subject to a review by the state. The strict
approach is advantageous to the two-level approach because it permits a
state to find ways to categorize treatments and place limits on doctors'
decision-making.
C. Increase in State Power: What Amount ofServices is Medically
Necessary?
Shortly after the Beal Supreme Court decision, the Fifth Circuit charted a
different course on the same topic. In Curtis v. Taylor, the Fifth Circuit
determined that the state could limit the amount of services provided to a
patient, even when those services were determined to be medically
necessary.59 Specifically, in this case, plaintiffs challenged a limit on the
amount of doctor visits Medicaid patients were allowed under the Florida
plan.60 The plan limited the number of medical visits to three per month. 6 1
The Fifth Circuit upheld the limit, saying that while physicians' services are
medically necessary, three visits per month was a reasonable limit on the
amount of services that Medicaid was required to cover.62 Thus, this
approach to medical necessity gives the state standing to challenge the
amount of services that are medically necessary to reasonably achieve the
63purpose of the service being provided.
D. Implications
As seen from this trend of cases and the different approaches taken by
courts to determine who has the power to decide what services are medically
necessary, the courts have clearly moved toward an increase in state power
and away from Beal v. Doe's instruction to give deference to physicians'
treatment decisions. While it is important to have a monitoring system in
place to prevent fraud and abuse of Medicaid funds, having such a system
will also result in a higher medical necessity standard (or a more strict
review of such services), potentially decreasing the amount of services




63. 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(b) (2011).
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provided to patients under the Medicaid program as a result of requiring
more stringent criteria to be met in order to qualify for services.
Specifically, this becomes problematic for children who are eligible for
services under EPSDT.
IV. MEDICAL NECESSITY STANDARDS FOR EPSDT PURPOSES
EPSDT, a specific provision of Medicaid, offers broader services to
children who are eligible for Medicaid. Therefore, the standard for
determining which services are offered is different than the standard used for
general Medicaid assistance. On its face, the Medicaid statute extends the
number of available services by including those that are not otherwise
offered under the state's Medicaid plan.64 EPSDT's statutory definition
requires the provision of any services that are needed to "correct or
ameliorate" a condition.65 Thus, even treatment that does not survive the
"medically necessary" Medicaid standard may be covered if it is used to
correct or ameliorate a problem. Congress indicates that the intent of
EPSDT is the identification of and prevention of medical problems for
children. 66 Thus, while states are free to implement limitations on their
services as a method of ensuring only medically necessary treatment is
provided for children, those limitations shall not impede EPSDT's purpose
of prevention.67 Further support for the role of a physician is the Senate
report from 1986, which states "the physician is to be the key figure in
determining utilization of health services.. .it is the physician who is to
decide upon admission to a hospital, order tests, drugs, and treatments[.]" 68
Yet, the reality of the situation is much more complex than Congress may
have anticipated when the statute was enacted. Some courts have properly
allowed physicians to make the medical necessity determination and
required states to comply and reimburse the treatment involved. This
approach honors the statute's purpose: to provide expansive coverage to
children on Medicaid through EPSDT. Despite the fact that there are very
few limits on what can be defined as medically necessary under EPSDT,
64. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r) (2006).
65. Id. § 1396d(r)(5).
66. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat.
2106 (1989).
67. Id.
68. S. Rep. No. 89-404, at 128 (1965) (Conf. Rep).
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courts have decided recent cases in a seemingly inequitable way that
deprives children of necessary medical care by giving states more power in
limiting physicians' discretion.
A. Physician as Sole Arbiter
In the 2003 Seventh Circuit decision of Collins v. Hamilton,6 9 the court
completely deferred to the physician when determining medical necessity.70
Collins involved a class action suit against the state of Indiana for its failure
to provide long-term residential psychiatric treatment under Medicaid's
EPSDT provision for individuals under the age of twenty-one.7 1 The court
72
held that residential treatment might be necessary for some children. If an
EPSDT screening determined this form of treatment is medically necessary
for a child, the state is required to fund the treatment. 3 Thus, the court
deferred to the determination by a hysician, which it refered to as a
"competent medical service provider."
Rosie D. v. Romney was a 2006 class action lawsuit brought in the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts against the state on
behalf of children with emotional disturbances for a failure to provide
services under Medicaid's EPSDT program. 75 The court held that "if a
licensed clinician finds a particular service to be medically necessary to help
a child improve his or her functional level, this service must be paid for by a
state's Medicaid plan pursuant to the EPSDT mandate." 76  The court
elaborated on the medical necessity requirement stating, "so long as a
competent medical provider finds specific care to be 'medically necessary'
69. Collins v. Hamilton, 349 F.3d 371, 371 (7th Cir. 2003).
70. Id. at 376.
71. Id. at 372.
72. Id. at 376.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Rosie D. v. Romney, 410 F. Supp. 2d 18,22 (D. Mass. 2006).
76. Id. at 26.
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to improve or ameliorate a child's condition, the 1989 amendments to the
Medicaid statute require a participating state to cover it." 77
Finally, in Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc. v. Arkansas Department of
Human Services, providers for and parents of children who were being
denied reimbursement and Medicaid coverage of an early intervention
program brought a lawsuit against the Arkansas agency and other state
officials. The Eighth Circuit Court found that a state must provide all
services necessary to correct or ameliorate conditions discovered by EPSDT
screenings, "whether or not such services are covered under the State
plan." 7 9 Specifically, the court stated that eligible children are entitled to
services recommended by a physician and Arkansas state plans must
reimburse the costs of such treatment. 80
These three cases are examples of the treating physician having the final
word on whether services must be provided by the state due to medical
necessity. However, despite these cases aligning with Congressional intent
and the purpose of the EPSDT program, a far greater number of courts have
recently limited physicians' authority to determine medical necessity.
B. State Limits on Physicians'Determinations
Consider the case of a severely disabled 16-year-old girl named Callie.8 1
After surviving a stroke in utero, Callie has spent her life afflicted by
numerous medical conditions and disabilities, 8 2 including cerebral palsy,
mental retardation, and six other chronic conditions.8 3 Callie is not only
blind and nonverbal, but also experiences frequent seizures and has trouble
swallowing and breathing on her own. 84  Callie requires multiple
77. Id.
78. Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc. v. Ark. Dep't. of Human Servs., 293 F.3d 472, 476-
77 (8th Cir. 2002).
79. Id. at 480 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r)(5)).
80. Id. at 480-81.
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medications per day, needs to be fed by another person, and requires
repeated repositioning of her body throughout the day.8 5 These conditions
are more than most parents or individuals with little medical training can
accommodate. In fact, Callie received ninety-four hours of specialized
private nursing services through Medicaid's Early, Periodic, Screening,
Diagnosis and Treatment (EPSDT) program.86 However, a judge decided
that the state, not Callie's doctor, had the power to decide the number of
hours of nursing services that were needed, and her parents now have the
burden of proving to the court that she needed such extensive care.
In ex rel. Moore v. Reese, the issue was not whether the medical services
provided to the patient were necessary, but rather what amount of the
prescribed services the state was required to provide under Medicaid. 89
Here, the physician prescribed ninety-four hours of private nursing services
to the young patient, and the state agency's medical expert contested that
ninety-four hours were not required. 90 The Fifth Circuit followed the
reasoning in Curtis and Rush, holding that the state has the "authority to
place limits on a service based on ... medical necessity[.]" 91 Here, the court
placed the burden on the child's representatives to prove that this specific
number of nursing service hours is necessary and remanded the case for
further evidence. Ultimately, the court allowed the state to limit the
amount of services the state was responsible for providing, even with a
85. Id. at 1224.
86. Id. at 1225.
87. Ex rel. Moore v. Reese, 637 F.3d 1220, 1257 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that "the
state may limit required private duty nursing services based upon a medical expert's
opinion of medical necessity" pursuant to 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(b), (c) (2006)).
88. Id. at 1258 (holding that "the plaintiff will have to show that the limits the state
imposed on her physician's discretion in reducing her nursing hours from ninety-four to
eighty-four hours a week are not reasonable - that these limits are not sufficient in
amount, duration, and scope to reasonably achieve the treatment's purpose.").
89. Id. at 1235.
90. Id. at 1231.
91. Id. at 1261.
92. Id. at 1258.
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showing that the type of services are medically necessary. 93 Here, the issue
goes beyond determining what kind of services Medicaid will cover, but
rather challenges the amount of duration of those services.
Moore demonstrates the court's misplaced reliance on the general
Medicaid standard of medical necessity in determining what services the
program should provide to patients under EPSDT. The Eleventh Circuit
found that the nursing services were a medically necessary service, but the
number of hours prescribed by the treating physician was in dispute and
subject to further evidence of necessity. 94 The problem with this, and the
reasoning behind the court's holding in the Moore decision, is that EPSDT
was intended to cover more services than typical state Medicaid plans for
adults. While it may be appropriate to require proof of necessity for
extensive nursing service hours for adults, such proof undermines
Congress's intent for EPSDT to be an expansive and comprehensive
program. The language of the EPSDT statute extends the number of
available services by including those not otherwise offered under the state's
Medicaid plan95 and uses the phrase "to correct or ameliorate" 96 as an
additional standard for its definition for medical necessity. Therefore,
applying the general Medicaid standard of necessity could disadvantage
countless children across the country.
Callie's case illustrates a critical point in the controversial area of
Medicaid coverage. Physicians' opinions will inevitably vary greatly from a
state's opinion on what qualifies as medical necessity in certain cases.
However, the standard for determining necessity under the EPSDT program
does not change. Where a particular service is agreed by both physician and
state to be medically necessary, states should refrain from placing
restrictions on the amount of a medically necessary service that the state is
willing to cover. Not only does this go beyond the simple determination of
what is medically necessary, but it also adds a complication by considering
amount and scope of coverage by the state. This additional dimension
undermines Congressional intent and will ultimately create inconsistencies
throughout EPSDT cases.
93. Id. at 1257.
94. Id at 1261.
95. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r) (2006).
96. Id. §1396d(r)(5).
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C. Current Interpretation ofMedical Necessity Undermines Congressional
Intent
EPSDT is meant to be a comprehensive, preventative program. The
statute specifically calls for EPSDT to provide "such other necessary health
care, diagnostic services, treatment, and other measures described in
subsection (a) of this section to correct or ameliorate defects and physical
and mental illnesses and conditions discovered by the screening services,
whether or not such services are covered under the State plan."97  In
establishing this program, Congress intended EPSDT to be a more
comprehensive program than state Medicaid programs for adults.98 That
intent is evident in the statute's additional provision for "such other
necessary 99 services, which the Medicaid statute does not include for
adults. Therefore, inferring from nothing but the content of the statutory
language, applying the same medical necessity standard courts use for
Medicaid at large would be inappropriate for a program as comprehensive as
EPSDT. This would defeat the purpose of EPSDT as a preventative and
inclusive program for children.
Further, allowing the state to have the authority to challenge physicians'
determinations of what treatment is medically necessary for their patients
minimizes the credibility of these physicians and challenges their ability to
diagnose and treat their patients. States' challenges of physicians'
determinations of medical necessity likely lies in the economic and budget
crisis facing government and health care in recent years. However, making
these cuts, specifically within Medicaid and EPSDT services, may not be
cost-effective in the long run. Because EPSDT aims to prevent medical
conditions from developing, cuts within the EPSDT program will only result
97. Id.
98. S. Rep. No. 89-404, pt. 1, at 1 (1965) (stating that the purpose of the law is "to
expand the services for maternal and child health, crippled children, child welfare, and
the mentally retarded...."). See also Rachel Min Luke, Reading Between the Lines:
Medicaid, Early Periodic Screening Diagnosis and Treatment, and Section 1983, 7
SEATTLE J. FOR Soc. JusT. 737, 739-40 (2009).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r)(5).
100. The general Medicaid statute lists fourteen categories of required or mandatory
services. See 42 C.F.R. Part 440. The adult Medicaid program does not include a
"medically necessary" provision. Therefore, EPSDT allows much more opportunity for
states to provide necessary services that may not be included in a particular listed
category.
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in greater costs for state Medicaid plans later when the conditions that
develop need to be treated. Thus, cutting state costs now will undermine the
preventative purpose of the EPSDT program.
V. EPSDT AS MAINTENANCE
In addition to the broad issue of "medical necessity," a new topic has
recently emerged - one that is detrimental to EPSDT and how those services
will continue to be provided in the future. While courts have inconsistently
decided the issue of medical necessity, courts have so far remained constant
in their approach to maintenance therapies and have repeatedly declared that
such services are to be included in the scope of the EPSDT provision of state
Medicaid programs.101  Not only do maintenance therapy issues depend
upon the interpretation of the EPSDT statute, but they also specifically rely
on how courts define "medical necessity" for children.
A. Overview ofMaintenance Therapy
Maintenance therapy is often beneficial for children with chronic
conditions that affect their motor functioning, such as cerebral palsy. In
these children, physical motions and capabilities are limited, and
maintenance therapy can help prevent the loss of functioning or
regression. 102 These children often receive physical and occupational
therapies as part of the treatment regimen for their condition. However, this
type of therapy works differently than traditional therapy for an acute
condition, such as a broken leg, where the purpose is to strengthen muscles
that have not been used in weeks. For such traditional patients, the muscles
quickly improve and the therapy is discontinued. In contrast, for children
with cerebral palsy or other chronic conditions, the physical or occupational
therapy serves to prevent regression of the condition; these therapies keep a
child's muscles moving to prevent further loss of function. They do not,
however, improve one's range of motion or overall functioning. Therefore,
these therapies do not necessarily correct or treat a chronic medical
condition, and are technically not required to be covered under Medicaid's
EPSDT program. 103 Nonetheless, these therapies prevent chronic conditions
101. See generally A.M.T. v. Gargano, 781 F. Supp. 2d 798 (S.D. Ind. 2011); see also
Elkoffv. Rodgers, 443 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1180-81 (D. Ariz. 2006).
102. See generally A.MT., 781 F. Supp. 2d at 805.
103. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r)(5) (limiting services under EPSDT to those that are
"medically necessary to correct or ameliorate" an illness or condition).
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from deteriorating or regressing and keep children from becoming
nonfunctioning.
B. Case Law
Two courts have defined EPSDT to include maintenance therapies. The
most recent case involving maintenance therapies and Medicaid's EPSDT
program is AMT v. Garganol04 from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana. Decided in 2011, this case involved a class-
action suit against Indiana for failure to reimburse for the costs of
maintenance therapy for children with cerebral palsy. 105 The Indiana
Medicaid program provides that physical therapy will not be covered for
more than two years unless a significant change in the medical condition is
shown.106 In determining how to rule on these facts, the court resorted to its
own interpretation of the phrase "to correct or ameliorate" in Medicaid's
EPSDT provision.107 The court relied on the interpretations of other courts
and held that the xhrase "to correct or ameliorate" means "to make better or
more tolerable."' Children need not demonstrate that their conditions have
regressed without physical therapy and maintenance measures. Rather, they
need only show that the therapies prevent regression, even if no further
progress is expected to be made and full functioning is not likely to be
restored.109 The court held that the "practice and policy of denying or
limiting prescribed therapies as maintenance therapy without considering a
disabled child's potential for regression violates federal Medicaid law." 10
104. A.M.T., 781 F. Supp. 2d at 798.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 803.
107. Id. at 806-07; see 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r)(5).
108. A.MT., 781 F. Supp. 2d at 806. In Collins v. Hamilton, the court stated that
"[r]equired treatment includes anything which is to make a condition, even a long-term
condition like mental illness, more tolerable." 231 F. Supp. 2d at 849, aff'd 349 F.3d 371
(7th Cir. 2003). The court in Elkoff v. Rodgers emphasized the inclusive and expansive
nature of Medicaid's EPSDT program and the preventive purpose of the program and
rejected the state's attempt to interpret that statute "in an extremely narrow manner that is
also impossible to integrate within the wider framework of Medicaid law." 443 F. Supp.
2d 1773, 1180-81 (D. Ariz. 2006).
109. A.MT., 781 F. Supp. 2d at 807.
110. Id.
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In a second case, Ekloff v. Rodgers, the United States District Court for
the District of Arizona considered whether incontinence briefs, another
medical service that does not restore functioning or provide treatment for a
condition, were covered under Medicaid's EPSDT program. "' Here, the
court relied heavily on the intent of Congress in creating the EPSDT
provisions and emphasized the preventative, inclusive, and expansive
purpose of the program.112  The court recognized the important role
incontinence briefs play in maintaining hygiene for children and preventing
infections or skin conditions. While the briefs do not correct a problem, they
do prevent other conditions from worsening and enable children to live more
healthy, social, and functional lives.
In Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc. v. Arkansas Dept. ofHuman Services, the
Eighth Circuit relied on the language of 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(13) in making
its decision on whether early intervention day treatment was medically
necessary and covered under EPSDT.113 The court reasoned the state must
reimburse the costs of any physician-recommended "service that would lead
to the maximum reduction of medical and physical disabilities and
restoration of the child to his or her best possible functional level."" l4 Here,
the court focused on the statutory term "ameliorate," rather than the
corrective requirement, and found these therapeutic interventions in the
Arkansas Program were necessary to restore the child to the best functioning
possible. The court did not find a requirement that the child be restored to
full functionality, but merely to his or her best functional level. Thus, the
court found that this early intervention program must be covered by
Arkansas' Medicaid program because it serves to ameliorate the conditions
and disabilities of the children enrolled.116
111. Elkoff,443F.Supp.2datll8O-81.
112. Id.
113. Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc. v. Ark. Dep't. of Human Servs., 293 F.3d 472, 480-
81 (8th Cir. 2002); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(13) (2006) (stating that among the
services covered by Medicaid are "diagnostic, screening, preventive, and rehabilitative
services, including any medical or remedial services ... recommended by a physician ...
for the maximum reduction of physical and mental disability and restoration of an
individual to the best possible functional level.").
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In these maintenance therapy cases, in contrast to the medical necessity
cases discussed previously, the courts adopt a liberal interpretation of the
statute and rely on the expansive intent of the EPSDT program. In doing so,
children receive more favorable outcomes and the results further the purpose
of the program. This contrast in outcomes underscores serious problems:
inconsistent interpretation and unpredictable outcomes for Medicaid's
neediest children. These problems can only be remedied through clarity in
the statute or by precedent requiring all lower courts to interpret statutes in
congruence with Congress's intent.
C. Maintenance Therapy Cases are in Furtherance of Congressional Intent
These maintenance therapy cases (Gargano, Elkoff and Pediatric
Specialty Care) interpreted the same statute as the medical necessity cases,
but allowed a more expansive view of the statutory language in the EPSDT
provisions. By looking at the intent of Congress, and interpreting the
statutory language accordingly, the courts arrived at decisions that favored
coverage of services that neither correct nor improve the children's
conditions. This outcome differs greatly from the medical necessity cases,
which limit the scope of coverage under EPSDT. The very different
outcomes of these two lines of cases were reached while purporting to
interpret the same statutory provision.
The facts and reasoning in Pediatric Specialty Care are similar to those in
Gargano. Both Pediatric Specialty Care and Gargano involve the issue of
whether Medicaid is required to cover services that are meant to improve
conditions but not necessarily to correct a condition or restore full
functioning. Fortunately, both courts have rightly determined that these
services are medically necessary under Medicaid's EPSDT program. These
cases properly serve Congress's intent for the EPSDT program and provide
children access to the services they are entitled to.
VI. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
A. Need for Clarity
The cases analyzing medical necessity and considering the necessity of
maintenance therapies purport to look at the same language in the statute and
consider the same evidence of Congressional intent, while somehow arriving
at different conclusions about the expansiveness of the coverage to children
under Medicaid's EPSDT provision. Where courts are looking at the same
statute but arriving at varied answers, a change needs to be made. Such
large discrepancies in the outcomes of cases, especially cases involving
Medicaid and the health of children, are intolerable. Judges in various
circuits and jurisdictions are free to interpret this federal legislation as they
see fit, which ultimately leads to unpredictable outcomes and inconsistent
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results for children. Children with the same conditions in two different
states might not be given the same treatment as a result of how a particular
state determines what is medically necessary.
With a move toward increased state power and decreased physician
discretion, uniformity is needed. Additionally, with the emerging use of
maintenance therapy, it is crucial that courts continue to include therapy
services for disabled and poorly functioning children. The only way to
ensure medically necessary services are provided uniformly and expansively
is to make changes in the law. A mandate needs to be issued, in the form of
a Supreme Court ruling or an amendment to the federal legislation, which
clarifies the terms of the EPSDT provision and expresses the intended result.
B. Money Matters
One of the most obvious concerns surrounding this topic is money.
Financial constraints are often a cause of programs being limited in scope.
Not surprisingly, one of the likely arguments against clarifying and
interpreting the terms of the EPSDT legislation in a more expansive way is
that it will result in states being required to provide more services for
children under the state Medicaid programs. Not only will states be
compelled to provide a greater range of services, but they will also need to
provide services that are broader in scope and duration. This will, of course,
increase the cost of the state programs.
In addition, there is potential for abuse and fraud within the framework of
state Medicaid programs. Allowing physicians to retain complete discretion
in determining what type of and how much treatment is medically necessary
lends itself to the potential for abuse of such discretion. Abuse and fraud
can result in states paying for services that are not medically necessary or
services beyond the scope of the legislative standards. This risk must be
balanced with the need for expansive services for children as well as the
intent of the legislature in choosing the medical necessity standard.
According to a report by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, most
fraud is committed by providers and not by individuals.
An estimated 80 percent of health care fraud - in both public
programs like Medicaid and Medicare and in private insurance -
is committed by health care providers, not individuals, according
to the National Health Care Fraud Association. The most common
types of provider fraud include billing for services that were not
provided or for more expensive procedures than were actually
performed, performing medically unnecessary services to generate
insurance payments, and falsifying a patient's diagnosis to justify
services or procedures that are not medically necessary. When
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individuals are involved in health care fraud, they frequently are
117unwitting participants - or even victims.
Therefore, if the reason for stricter state oversight is to save money and
prevent fraud, it is not likely that rejecting physicians' decisions regarding
what is medically necessary is going to accomplish that end. Fraud
frequently exists in the billing practices of providers, not in the requests for
services of children in need. The result of this ineffective attempt to curb
abuse and fraud is that children are being victimized and underserved.
Instead, the judgment of physicians should not be second-guessed by states.
Allowing physicians to make the decisions in accordance with the Medicaid
statute and the intent of Congress would properly serve children.
The Medicaid statute includes no monetary limits on medical services or
treatment, nor does it mention a cap on services to individuals." With few
limits within the twenty-eight listed categories of services to be provided by
Medicaid to adults, Congress made clear that EPSDT should include "such
other necessary health care, diagnostic services, treatment, and other
measures ... to correct or ameliorate defects and physical and mental
illnesses and conditions discovered by the screening services, whether or not
such services are covered under the State plan."' 1  The only limitation on
what these services may include is that the services must be used to "correct
or ameliorate" a problem.120 In creating such a broad provision, Congress
was likely aware that the services would be more numerous and would
therefore increase costs for states and the federal government.
Decreasing physicians' discretion will likely cut state costs, an important
consideration given today's economy and the severe constraints on
governmental budgets. However, limiting discretion would also undermine
the purpose of the EPSDT program and pose two important problems for
states. First, while a policy of increased physician oversight and increased
state review of medical necessity determinations may limit abuse, fraud, and
result in monetary savings, it would impose more administrative costs.
States would have to routinely review physicians' determinations and to do
so would need to establish a system of review (such as a board, panel, or
117. Sarah Lueck, Medicaid Maintenance-of-Effort Provisions Do Not Stop States
from Fighting Fraud, CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, 3-4 (Apr. 24, 2012),
http://www.cbpp.org/files/6-6-1 1health.pdf.
118. 42 USC § 1396d(a).
119. Id. §1396d(r)(5).
120. Id.
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agency) that would approve each service. While exact costs of such a
system have not been determined or estimated at this time, the review
process would represent a cost increase from current state spending levels.
Second, a strict review of EPSDT services may result in fewer
preventative treatments being provided to children. Prevention programs,
such as EPSDT, provide screenings, diagnosis, and treatment for conditions
early in life in an effort to prevent the higher cost of treatment when
conditions worsen later in life. Cutting costs in the prevention arena, then,
would increase treatment costs for older children and adults later in life.
Thus, it ultimately becomes a question of when the states choose to pay for
the services - immediately in order to save money, or in the future at a
potentially higher cost. While it may be helpful to allow states the power to
limit treatment and services that physicians deem necessary, it is not wise in
the long run nor is it in line with Congressional intent.
C. Federal Versus State Power
In addition to raising financial concerns, a discussion of proper
interpretation of the EPSDT statute inevitably leads to constitutional
concerns. None of these arguments have merit nor can they serve to negate
the fact that Congress can and should clarify the terms of the statute that
provide for Medicaid's EPSDT program. At the most basic level, two
constitutional provisions provide for Congress's authority and power to
enact and enforce Medicaid's statutory provisions: (1) the Spending Clause;
and (2) the Necessary and Proper Clause.
On a basic level, Article I Section 8 of the Constitution expressly grants
Congress the power "to pay the [d]ebts and provide for the common
[d]efence and general [w]elfare of the United States."' 2 1  Further, the
Necessary and Proper Clause serves as an additional grant of power for
Congress to pass any laws that are necessary to carry out its obligations,
such as promoting the general welfare. First, it is important to define the
purposes for which Congress is allowed to spend money, namely, what the
"general [w]elfare" constitutes. This power has been interpreted broadly by
the Supreme Court in Helvering v. Davis, which upheld the constitutionality
of the Social Security Act of 1935.122 The Supreme Court explained:
The problem is plainly national in area and dimensions. Moreover,
laws of the separate states cannot deal with it effectively.
Congress, at least, had a basis for that belief. States and local
governments are often lacking in the resources that are necessary
121. U.S. CoNST. ART. I § 8, Ci. 1.
122. See generally Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937).
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to finance an adequate program of security for the aged.... A
system of old age pensions has special dangers of its own if put in
force in one state and rejected in another. The existence of such a
system is bait to the needy and dependent elsewhere, encouraging
them to migrate and seek a haven of repose. Only a power that is
national can serve the interests of all. 123
The reasoning of Helvering can be applied to Medicaid, another national
program intended for the benefit of the needy, disabled, and elderly.
Because health care programs satisfy the definition of "general [w]elfare"
and Helvering upheld such federal programs, Congress clearly acted within
the authority granted to it by the Spending Clause of the Constitution when it
created the Medicaid program.
The second important constitutional consideration is whether or not, in
enacting a federal program, Congress has the authority to define what
actions states can and cannot perform, or what they must or must not do. In
essence, the question to be considered is whether or not Congress can so
closely regulate the conduct of each state within its own individualized
Medicaid plan. Here, the answer is a resounding "yes," and Congress, in
fact, must set such guidelines and standards. In Pennhurst State School and
Hospital v. Halderman, 124 the Supreme Court relies on a string of cases that
"have long recognized that Congress may fix the terms on which it shall
disburse federal money to the States."' 25  The Court expands on this
foundation by stating that:
. . . legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in
the nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the States agree
to comply with federally imposed conditions. The legitimacy of
Congress' power to legislate under the spending power thus rests
on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms
of the "contract." 26
The structure of Medicaid requires states that choose to participate in the
program to conform to the guidelines set forth by the federal legislation.1 2 7
123. Id. at 644.
124. Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 1 (1981).
125. Id. at 17 (citing Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 397 (1970); King v. Smith,
392 U.S. 309, 309 (1968); Okla. v. CSC, 330 U.S. 127, 127 (1947)).
126. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 2.
127. R.K. v. Dillenberg, 836 F. Supp. 694, 696 (D. Ariz. 1993) (clarifying that "state
governments possess primary responsibility for administration of the program, but in so
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There is no requirement that a state participate in this program. Medicaid is
a voluntary program that supplies federal funds to states that provide
medical care and services to needy, disabled, and elderly residents. States
agree to the terms of the program and, therefore, agree to provide the
services that Congress requires.
In this way, Congress sets a floor, but not a ceiling. Specifically, the
federal legislation provides a list of services that must be provided by all
state Medicaid plans and also sets forth a standard by which a state may
reasonably limit those services. States are free to provide more expansive
services under Medicaid, but may not, under any circumstance, provide less
than what the federal legislation mandates.' 28 Given the powers granted by
the Constitution and interpreted over the years through Supreme Court
decisions, the structure of the Medicaid program and the limitation of
Medicaid programs by Congressional legislation are constitutional. It would
also be constitutional and within the powers of Congress to clarify the
standards currently used to determine which services are to be provided by
Medicaid (such as "medically necessary"). Because Congress had the
authority to create and regulate such a program, Congress also has the
authority to define the terms used in the legislation and set specific
requirements on participating states. The clarification of these limitations
and terms would solve the inconsistencies resulting from court decisions and
ensure that Congressional intent is upheld through the EPSDT program.
D. Public Policy Concerns
While this note bases much of its analysis on statutory language,
Congressional intent, and judicial decisions, there is a more basic, humane
reason why the issue of Medicaid coverage of children must be considered.
The reason is not only the ease of jurisdictions having uniform procedures or
the ease of predictability that comes with such uniformity. The reason lies
outside of judicial interpretation or applicable precedents, and lies instead
within the realm of public policy, social justice, and human nature. Children
should be entitled to healthy lives.129
doing must abide by the requirements of the Act to qualify for receipt of federal Medicaid
funds").
128. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396(d)(r)(5) (2006).
129. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, art. 23-24, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3 (Nov. 20, 1989), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/pdf/crc.pdf; see also
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 127/11 IA, U.N.
Doc.A/RES/217(l 11) (Dec. 18, 1992), available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/
udhr/index.shtml.
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Public policy should protect and care for children. The health of a person
is the cornerstone upon which many other measures of success rely. The
physical health of a person, especially of a child, determines, in part, the
future of that child. A healthy body is the first step toward a healthy mind.
Both of those are important in helping to shape positive members of society.
And the legal system, indeed, cares about the character and actions of
members of society. Thus, the EPSDT provision should be preserved as it is
an important vehicle in this effort to make positive changes today for the
benefit of society tomorrow.
VII. CONCLUSION
The issues of medical necessity and maintenance therapy are not new to
EPSDT and Medicaid law. These issues are litigated in courts throughout
the country each year and, because each state has its own Medicaid program,
each jurisdiction has relied on its own precedent to determine the proper
answer. State discretion within each state's own Medicaid and EPSDT
program has led to inconsistent results for needy children. Some states have
strictly interpreted the statute and found truly necessary services to be
outside of the scope of EPSDT, while other states have liberally interpreted
the statute and defined maintenance therapy as a necessary service. The
trending increase in state power to determine medical necessity will mean
less coverage for children in need of medical treatment. An increase in state
power undermines the intent of Congress in creating the EPSDT mandate.
Therefore, the federal government needs to once again take action to protect
children and clarify the intent and the scope of the EPSDT program. This
can be done through legislation that clarifies the EPSDT statute and provides
uniform guidelines for all states to follow.
Though Medicaid programs vary among states, Medicaid (and EPSDT)
was a federal initiative. Thus, Congressional intent should control the limits
and scope of state programs. State courts need federal guidelines to direct
them in ensuring that children across the country receive equal,
comprehensive services as needed under EPSDT. This issue is critical and
relevant today, and will continue to be an emerging and pressing problem as
more children are denied necessary services. More importantly, this is an
issue that should be promptly addressed and clarified by federal statute to
ensure equitable and consistent services to children across the country.
